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W HEN Congress in 1908 enacted the present Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act,2 conflicting state
legislation concerning assumption of risk, fellow-servant
rule, contributory negligence, and certain other defenses,
yielded - where applicable - to the uniform rule pre-
scribed by the Federal statute. Namesake of the English
act of 18808 but bearing little resemblance thereto, it has
been suggested that a better name, or at least one less
confusing, would have been the "Federal Fellow-Servant
Act." 4 The title of the act declares it to be "An Act
relating to the liability of common carriers by railroad to
their employees in certain cases." An amendment was
enacted in 1910, but no subsequent amendments have
been passed in the succeeding twenty-five years. There-
fore, at this writing, the act embraces only common car-
riers by railroad. It has been held not to include express
companies 5 or sleeping-car companies. 6 Efforts have
been made, however, through bills introduced into Con-
gress, to extend its provisions to express, freight-for-
warding, and sleeping-car companies.
7
I Member of the Illinois Bar; alumna of Chicago-Kent College of Law.
2 U. S. C. A., tit. 45, secs. 51-59, 35 Stat. 65.
3 43 and 44 Vict., c. 42.
4 18 R. C. L. 825, sec. 279, Master and Servant.
5 Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U. S. 175, 41 S. Ct. 93, 65 L. Ed. 205
(1920).
6 Robinson v. Baltimore and Ohio R. Co., 237 U. S. 84, 35 S. Ct. 491, 59 L.
Ed. 849 (1915).
7 H. R. 2901, introduced by Mr. Weaver, 74th Congress, 1st session, January
3, 1935.
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The act governs the liability of the carriers in certain
cases. These are cases where the common carrier by rail-
road is engaging in interstate commerce (except actions
arising in the territories, the District of Columbia, the
Panama Canal Zone or other possessions) and where
the injury or death of the person employed in such com-
merce is due in whole or in part to the negligence of the
officers, agents, or employees of the carrier, or by reason
of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its
cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed,
works, boats, wharves, or other equipment. To bring an
injured employee within the protection of the act there
must have been negligence4-and causal negligence 9 -on
the part of the carrier. It is obvious also that both the
carrier and the employee must have been employed in
interstate commerce at the time of the injury. When both
the subjects fall within its terms, the Federal act is
exclusive. 10 It is held that it is immaterial that the
employee, whose negligence caused the injury was not
engaged in interstate commerce," or, with reference to
actions based on safety appliance violations, that the de-
fective instrumentality causing the injury was not used
in such commerce at the time of the accident.'
2
The practical importance of deciding at the outset,
when a given state of facts exists, whether or not the
8 Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Aeby, 275 U. S. 426, 48 S. Ct. 177, 72 L. Ed.
351 (1928); Seaboard Air Line Railway v. Horton, 233 U, S. 492, 34 S.
Ct. 635, 58 L. Ed. 1062 (1914); New Orleans and North Eastern R. Co. v.
Harris, 247 U. S. 367, 38 S. Ct. 535, 62 L. Ed. 1167 (1918); New York
Central R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147, 37 S. Ct. 546, 61 L. Ed. 1045
(1917); Baltimore and Ohio R. Co. v. Berry, 286 U. S. 272, 52 S. Ct. 510,
76 L. Ed. 1098 (1932); Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Saxon,
284 U. S. 458, 52 S. Ct. 229, 76 L. Ed. 397 (1932).
9 Northwestern Pacific R. Co. v. Bobo, Administratrix, 290 U. S. 499, 54
S. Ct. 263, 78 L. Ed. 462 (1934).
10 Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 32 S. Ct. 169, 56 L. Ed.
327 (1912), quoting Chief Justice Marshall in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316.
11 Pedersen v. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western R. Co., 229 U. S. 146,
33 S. Ct. 648, 57 L. Ed. 1125 (1913).
12 Texas and Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, 36 S. Ct. 482, 60 L.
Ed. 874 (1916); San Antonio and Arkansas Pass Ry. Co. v. Wagner, 241
U. S. 476, 36 S. Ct. 626, 60 L. Ed. 1110 (1916). But employee injured while
exclusively in intrastate commerce must recover under state law. Gilvary v.
Cuyahoga Valley Ry. Co., 292 U. S. 57, 54 S. Ct. 573, 73 L. Ed. 1123 (1934).
For Safety Appliance Acts see U. S. C. A., tit. 45, sec. 1 et seq.
EMPLOYMENT UNDER FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT 193
Federal statute applies, lies in the fact that it is a con-
dition precedent to recovery that the action shall be
commenced within two years from the day the cause of
action accrues. One who mistakenly pursues his remedy
under the common law or state statute may find his
action under the Federal act barred by the time he
learns that it is exclusive on the subject. The Supreme
Court has held that there is no liability if suit is not
brought within the two-year period. 18 It behooves the
practitioner, therefore, to examine well the question be-
fore he brings his suit; for further investigation will
develop that under this act, unlike the ordinary action,
no provision exists for tolling the statute, and the plain-
tiff cannot avail himself of infancy,' 4 fraud and deceit
in inducing him not to sue, 5 insanity, 6 or the protection
of another Federal statute.17 Furthermore, the limita-
tion applies although the defendant does not affirmatively
plead it.'
DEFINITIONS
Section 7 provides that the term "common carrier"
used in the act shall include its receivers or those
charged with the duty of managing and operating its
business. Beyond this, the act is barren of guiding defini-
tions, and aid must be sought in the decisions of those
courts which control the construction of a Federal stat-
ute. It is pointed out that the act uses the term "inter-
state commerce." It has been held that the term "com-
1 Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Burnette, 239 U. S. 199, 36 S. Ct. 75,
60 L. Ed. 226 (1915); Bell v. Wabash Ry. Co., 58 F. (2d) 569 (C. C. A.
8th, 1932).
14 Gillette v. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western R. Co., 91 N. J. L. 220,
102 A. 673 (1917). Plaintiff was injured when under age. One year after
reaching his majority, but nearly six years after the accident, he sued. The
court concluded that the minority of the plaintiff did not suspend the opera-
tion of the section of the act which requires that suit be brought within two
years from the day the cause of action accrues.
15Bement v. Grand Rapids and Indiana Ry. Co., 194 Mich. 64, 160 N. W.
424 (1916).
16 Alvarado v. Southern Pacific Co., 193 S. W. 1108 (Tex. Civ. App., 1917).
17 Davis v. Chrisp, 159 Ark. 335, 252 S. W. 606, cert. den. 263 U. S. 710,
44 S. Ct. 36, 68 L. Ed. 518, writ of error dismissed 267 U. S. 572, 45. S. Ct.
227, 69 L. Ed. 793 (1925).
18 Atlantic Coast Line v. Burnette, 239 U. S. 199, 36 S. Ct. 75, 60 L. Ed.
226 (1915).
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merce" comprehends more than the mere exchange of
goods; that it embraces commercial intercourse in all
its branches, including transportation of passengers and
property by common carriers, whether carried on by
water or by land. This definition is found in the Second
Employers' Liability Cases'9 wherein the constitutional-
ity of the act was upheld. The court in those cases stated
that the power of Congress over commerce among the
states extends incidentally to every instrument and agent
by which such commerce is carried on, but that it does
not extend to any matter or thing which does not have
a real or substantial relation to some part of such
commerce.
To avoid an extended consideration of the definition of
a carrier engaging in interstate commerce, suffice it to
say that interstate commerce is generally understood
to mean the movement of traffic from one state or ter-
ritory into, or through, some other state or territory."
It has been held to cover all stages of transportation
from acceptance by the carrier at point of shipment to
final delivery to consignee at destination2 as well as
handling at terminal points.2 The character of a rail-
road as a medium of interstate transportation is not
derived from one particular mile of road, one particular
station or terminal. It is conceivable, of course, that a
road would lie wholly within one state, isolated and
with no connections, and that it would never carry an
interstate passenger or a pound of interstate freight.
This, however, is an extreme situation. In the main, the
railroads all engage in interstate transportation and
some of their employees come within the act. Therefore,
to determine when an employee is in interstate commerce
is a question of large importance.
As stated, this is a Federal statute on which decisions
19 223 U. S. 1, 32 S. Ct. 169, 56 L. Ed. 327 (1912).
20 United States v. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co., 162 F. 775 (1908).
21 Philadelphia and Reading Ry. Co. v. Hancock, 253 U. S. 284, 40 S.
Ct. 512, 64 L. Ed. 907 (1920).
22 St. Louis, San Francisco and Texas Ry. Co. v. Scale, 229 U. S. 156, 33
S. Ct. 651, 57 L. Ed. 1129 (1913).
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of Federal courts are controlling.23 The initial inquiry,
therefore, is whether or not the Supreme Court of the
United States has considered the question and what test,
if any, it has laid down for applying the act to particular
facts. A suggestion of the perplexity of the courts
touching the application of the act is found in the de-
cision of a district judge in a case which was decided
in 1910:
I do not know how far this employer's liability act will be
extended as to the class of employees held to be engaged in
interstate commerce; but it seems reasonably clear to me that a
man engaged in repairing bridges and doing bridge work gen-
erally, even though he worked in different states for the railroad
company, is not engaged in interstate commerce within the mean-
ing of this act.24
The Supreme Court arrived at exactly the opposite re-
sult in Pedersen v. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western
Railroad Company.2
SUPREME COURT CASES
The Pedersen case, decided in 1913, comes in the van-
guard of decisions following the Second Employers'
Liability Cases. Pedersen and a fellow employee, in the
course of their duties, were carrying from a tool car
to a bridge some rivets which were to be used that
night or early the following morning in removing an
existing girder from the bridge and inserting a new
one. While passing over an intervening temporary
bridge en route to the bridge to be repaired, Pedersen
was run down by an intrastate passenger train. Both
bridges were regularly used in interstate and intrastate
commerce. The majority opinion-that the employee was
in interstate commerce at the time of his injury-was
based on the ground that tracks and bridges are instru-
mentalities indispensable to interstate commerce, that
the security and efficiency of the commerce is in large
23 Southern Ry. Co. v. Gray, Administratrix, 241 U. S. 333, 36 S. Ct. 558,
60 L. Ed. 1030 (1916).
24 District Judge Newman, Taylor v. Southern Ry. Co., 178 F. 380 (C. Ct.,
N. D. Ga., 1910).
25 229 U. S. 146, 33 S. Ct. 648, 57 L. Ed. 1125 (1913).
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measure dependent on their being kept in repair, that the
rivets were necessary to the repair of the bridge, and
that the act of taking them to the bridge was part of
the removal of the girder. The court said:
Among the questions which naturally arise in this connection
are these: Was that work being done independently of the inter-
state commerce in which the defendant was engaged, or was it so
closely connected therewith as to be a part of it? Was its per-
formance a matter of indifference so far as that commerce
was concerned, or was it in the nature of a duty resting upon
the carrier? ... The true test always is: Is the work in question
a part of the interstate commerce in which the carrier is
engaged?
Dissenting, Justice Lamar-with whom Justices Holmes
and Lurton concurred-pointed out the distinction be-
tween employees engaged in commerce, that is, trans-
portation, and those engaged in other departments of
its business. The nub of the opinion follows:
It is conceded that a line must be drawn between those em-
ployees of the carrier who are employed in commerce and those
engaged in other departments of its business. It must be drawn
so as to take in, on one side, those engaged in transportation,
which is commerce; otherwise there is no logical reason why it
should not include every agent of the company; for there is no
other test by which to determine when we must sue under the
state statute and when under the act of Congress; for if a man
on his way to repair a bridge is engaged in interstate com-
merce, then the man in the shop who made the bolts to be used
in repairing the bridge is likewise so engaged. If they are,
then the man who paid them their wages, and the bookkeeper
who entered those payments in the accounts, are similarly en-
gaged. For they are all employed by the carrier, and the work
of each contributes to its success in hauling freight and
passengers.
It will be conceded, as pointed out so clearly in the
minority opinion, that the mere employment by a carrier
engaging in interstate commerce does not bring the
employee within the act, for if it did, then every clerical
employee would be included-a result obviously not in-
tended by Congress. In a Mississippi case, the court held
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that a claim agent was not engaged in interstate com-
merce when returning from the performance of duties
in connection with his regular work.26 It would not be
seriously contended that office employees of interstate
carriers engaging in commerce between the states are
subjected by reason of such employment to greater haz-
ards than office employees in other pursuits of industry
and commerce.
Returning to the test as expounded in the Pedersen
case, we find the court a year later considering the case
of Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Behrens.27
Behrens, a fireman, was a member of a crew which han-
dled interstate and intrastate commerce indiscriminately,
frequently moving both at once and at times turning
directly from one to the other. When he was injured, the
crew was moving several cars loaded with freight which
was wholly intrastate, and upon completing that move-
ment the crew was to have gathered up and moved to
other points several other cars as a step in their trans-
portation to destinations within and without the state.
Applying the test laid down in the Pedersen case, the
court said:
Here, at the time of the fatal injury the intestate was en-
gaged in moving several cars, all loaded with intrastate freight,
from one part of the city to another. That was not a service
in interstate commerce, and so the injury and resulting death
were not within the statute. That he was expected, upon the
completion of that task, to engage in another which would
have been a part of interstate commerce, is immaterial under
the statute, for by its terms the true test is the nature of the
work being done at the time of the injury.
In the Pedersen case the court, in stating the test, used
the term "interstate commerce." Three years later in
Shanks v. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad
Company,28 the court expressed the view that Congress
in adopting the act spoke of interstate commerce, not
26 Gulf, Mobile and Northern R. Co. v. Myers, 145 Miss. 555, 110 So. 444,
cert. den. 273 U. S. 766, 47 S. Ct. 570, 71 L. Ed. 881 (1927).
27 233 U. S. 473, 34 S. Ct. 646, 58 L. Ed. 1051 (1914).
28 239 U. S. 556, 36 S. Ct. 188, 60 L. Ed. 436 (1916).
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in a technical legal sense, but in a practical one, and that
the true test of employment in such commerce in the
sense intended was this: Was the employee at the time
of the injury engaged in interstate transportation or in
work so closely related to it as to be practically a part
of it ? In thus substituting the word "transportation" for
"commerce" the court sought to confine the application
of the test to cases where the employee was engaged in
the actual movement of persons and things or in work
closely related to the act of transportation. The em-
ployee's duty in the Shanks case was to repair locomotive
parts in a shop where the railroad company repaired
both interstate and intrastate equipment. At the time
of the injury he was engaged solely in the removal of a
heavy shop fixture which was used to communicate
power to machinery utilized in repairing parts of engines
some of which were used in interstate transportation.
The court held that the connection between the fixture
and interstate transportation was too remote from inter-
state transportation to be practically a part of it. In
its opinion the court said:
Coming to apply the test to the case in hand, it is plain that
Shanks was not employed in interstate transportation, or in
repairing or keeping in usable condition a roadbed, bridge,
engine, car, or other instrument then in use in such trans-
portation.
The test in the Shanks case was applied in New York
Central Railroad Company v. White,29 where the court
held that a night watchman was not engaged in interstate
transportation while guarding tools and materials in-
tended to be used in the construction of a new station
and new tracks upon a line of interstate railroad.
Another case which applied the test was Southern
Pacific Company v. Industrial Accident Commission of
California." Here the employee was an electric lineman.
The company, a common carrier by railroad, maintained
a power house where it manufactured the electric cur-
rent which moved its cars in both interstate and intra-
29243 U. S. 188, 37 S. Ct. 247, 61 L. Ed. 667 (1917).
30251 U. S. 259, 40 S. Ct. 130, 64 L. Ed. 258 (1920).
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state commerce. From the generators, this current
passed along the main lines or cables, through a trans-
forming station, to the trolley wires, and thence to the
motors. The employee was atop a pole, wiping insul-
ators, when he received an electric shock which caused
him to fall to his death. He was working at the time on
one of the main lines necessary to be kept in serviceable
condition. The court said:
Power is no less essential than tracks or bridges to the move-
ment of cars. The accident under consideration occurred while
deceased was wiping insulators actually supporting a wire which
then carried electric power so intimately connected with the
propulsion of cars that if it had been short-circuited through
his body, they would have stopped instantly. Applying the sug-
gested test, we think these circumstances suffice to show that
his work was directly and immediately connected with inter-
state transportation, and an essential part of it.
In Industrial Accident Commission v. Davis,31 the em-
ployee was injured while working on an engine sent
for overhauling, from exclusive employment in inter-
state commerce to the general repair shops, where it
remained for more than two months. At the time of
the injury the engine was nearly stripped and dis-
mantled, although it was returned to interstate commerce
comparatively soon after the accident. The court said:
We refrain from a review of our cases. They pronounce a
test and illustrate it. We are called upon to apply it to the
present controversy. The Federal act gives redress only for
injuries received in interstate commerce. But how determine
the commerce? Commerce is movement, and the work and gen-
eral repair shops of a railroad, and those employed in them,
are accessories to that movement-indeed, are necessary to it;
but so are all attached to the railroad company-official, clerical,
or mechanical. Against such a broad generalization of relation
we, however, may instantly pronounce, and successively against
lesser ones, until we come to the relation of the employment to
the actual operation of the instrumentalities for a distinction
between commerce and no commerce. In other words, we are
31 259 U. S. 182, 42 S. Ct. 489, 66 L. Ed. 888 (1922).
CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW
brought to a consideration of degrees, and the test declared, that
the employee, at the time of the injury, must be engaged in
interstate transportation or in work so closely related to it as
to be practically a part of it, in order to displace state juris-
diction and make applicable the Federal act.
The court illustrated the difference in the instrumental-
ities, adding that it was impossible to declare a standard
invariable by circumstances. The injured man was held
not to come within the provisions of the Federal act.
That the court recognized the disinction between the
word "commerce" and the word "transportation" as
used in stating the test appears from its decision in 1931
in the case of Chicago and North Western Railway Com-
pany v. Bolle,2 which came up from Illinois. The injury
occurred while a locomotive which had been temporarily
substituted for a stationary engine-utilized to generate
steam for a passenger depot and other structures used
for general railroad purposes, suburban coaches waiting
to be taken up by interstate trains, bunk cars, and for
keeping a turntable from freezing-was being moved
about four miles distant for coal. The sole object of the
movement was to get the coal supply to generate steam
and, although it was attached during its movement to
three other locomotives each of which was about to be
used in interstate transportation, it was unrelated to
the contemplated employment of the other locomotives.
In commenting on the distinction between the terms
'commerce'' and "transportation," the court said:
The appellate court, in holding upon the first appeal that
respondent was not engaged in interstate commerce, applied the
rule laid down in the Shanks case, . . . supra; and in so doing
was clearly right.
It will be observed that the word used in defining the test
is "transportation," not the word "commerce." The two words
were not regarded as interchangeable, but as conveying different
meanings. Commerce covers the whole field of which transporta-
tion is only a part; and the word of narrower signification was
a2 284 U. S. 74, 52 S. Ct. 59, 76 L. Ed. 173 (1931).
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chosen understandingly and deliberately as the appropriate
term. The business of a railroad is not to carry on commerce
generally. It is engaged in the transportation of persons and
things in commerce; and hence the test of whether an employee
at the time of his injury is engaged in interstate commerce,
within the meaning of the act, naturally must be whether he
was engaged in interstate transportation or in work so closely
related to such transportation as to be practically a part of it.
Since the decision in the Shanks case, the test there laid
down has been steadily adhered to, and never intentionally
departed from or otherwise stated.
In its opinion the court referred to Illinois Central Rail-
road Company v. Cousins,3 where an employee was en-
gaged in wheeling a barrow of coal to heat the shop
where other employees were at work repairing cars that
had been, and were to be, used in interstate traffic,
and said:
The state court held that the employee came within the act,
on the ground that the work which he was doing was a part
of the interstate commerce in which the carrier was engaged,
and cited Pedersen v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 229 U. S. 146.
This court, however, repudiated that view, and reversed in an
opinion per curiam on the authority of the Shanks case.
The court cites the cases in which the rule in the Shanks
case has been categorically restated, adding:
The applicable test thus firmly established is not to be shaken
by the one or two decisions of this court where, inadvertently,
the word "commerce" has been employed instead of the word
"transportation."
Thus the court definitely settled the questions which
were raised by the use of the two terms in stating the
rule.
In 1932, in Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad Com-
pany v. Industrial Commission of Illinois, 4 the court fur-
ther restricted the test when it definitely overruled the
earlier decisions in Erie Railroad Company v. Collins"5
33 241 U. S. 641, 36 S. Ct. 446, 60 L. Ed. 1216 (1916).
34284 U. S. 296, 52 S. Ct. 151, 76 L. Ed. 304 (1932).
35253 U. S. 77, 40 S. Ct. 450, 64 L. Ed. 790 (1920).
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and Erie Railroad Company v. Szary.36 In the last-men-
tioned case the employee, in attempting to oil an electric
motor while it was running, was injured by having his
hand caught in the gears. The motor furnished power
for hoisting coal into a chute to be taken therefrom by
engines principally employed in moving interstate
freight. The railway company relied on the Collins case,
where the employee operated a gasoline engine to pump
water into a tank for use of locomotives in both kinds of
commerce, and the Szary case, where the injured man at
the time was applying heat to dry sand for use in loco-
motives used in both kinds of commerce. The court
stated that the cases relied on by the railway company
were out of harmony with the general current of the
decisions of the court since the Shanks case, and added
that Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company
v. Harrington,37 furnished the correct rule. Harrington
was injured while engaged in removing coal from the
storage tracks to the chutes from which were supplied
locomotives of all classes, some engaged in interstate and
others in intrastate movement, and the court held that
there was no such close or direct relation to interstate
transportation in the taking of the coal to the coal chutes
as to bring him within the act.
In New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Com-
pany v. Bezue,8s the injured man was engaged in trans-
ferring the main driving wheels of a locomotive from
the lathe in the hoist shop of the railroad to a turntable
preparatory to placing them under the locomotive which
was to be in the shop twelve days for boiler wash and
which at the time of the injury was inert and incapable
of locomotion. The injury occurred on the ninth day.
The state court held that the employee was engaged in a
"plant service" and that the nature of the plant war-
ranted the characterization of all his work of whatever
nature as in interstate commerce. The court, holding
36 253 U. S. 86, 40 S. Ct. 454, 64 L. Ed. 794 (1920).
37 241 U. S. 177, 36 S. Ct. 517, 60 L. Ed. 941 (1916).
88284 U. S. 415, 52 S. Ct. 205, 76 L. Ed. 370 (1932).
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that the test thus applied was broader than its decisions
justify, said:
All work performed in railroad employment may, in a sense, be
said to be necessary to the operation of the road. The business
could not be conducted without repair shop employees, clerks,
janitors, mechanics, and those who operate all manner of appli-
ances not directly or intimately concerned with interstate trans-
portation as such, or with facilities actually used therein. But
we have held that the mere fact of employment does not bring
such employees within the act....
The criterion of applicability of the statute is the employee's
occupation at the time of his injury in interstate transportation
or work so closely related thereto as to be practically a part
of it .... The length of the period during which the locomotive
was withdrawn from service and the extent of the repairs bring
the case within the principle announced in Industrial Accident
Commission v. Davis . . . and Minneapolis and St. Louis Rail-
road Company v. Winters... stamp the engine as no longer an
instrumentality of or intimately connected with interstate activ-
ity, and distinguish such cases as New York Central Railroad
Company v. Marcone... where the injured employee was oiling
a locomotive which had shortly before entered the roundhouse
after completing an interstate run.
Those who hailed the Pedersen case as the harbinger
of a construction liberal in the extreme must observe
in subsequent decisions a conscious effort to restrict the
application of the act so far as the employee is con-
cerned. However, the opposite tendency is noted with
respect to safety appliances, a recent decision 9 having
the effect of requiring a gasoline tractor used in switch-
ing to have power brakes, and a hand car to have an
automatic coupler.
APPICATION OF THE TEST
The selection of those employees who would be in-
cluded in the first group described, namely, those en-
gaged in interstate transportation, is not so difficult as
the determination of those embraced within the second
3 9 Hoffman v. New York, New Haven and Hartford R. Co., 74 F. (2d) 227
(C. C. A. 2d, 1934), cert. den. Feb. 11, 1935, 55 S. Ct. 513.
CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW
group, that is, employees engaged in work so closely
related to interstate transportation as to be practically
a part of it.
All those employees who, as operatives, man trains
moving or carrying interstate freight, 0 employees who
carry interstate freight, baggage or mail,41 who load it
into cars or unload it therefrom, 42 who switch it at ter-
minals,48 or who handle interstate shipments even within
the limits of the same state,44 are among the workers
included in the first group. The hauling of empty cars45
and the movement of company material from one state
to another 46 have been held to constitute interstate trans-
portation within the act. Furthermore, the protection of
the Federal statute is thrown about these employees
when they enter the premises of the employer for the
purpose of beginning their day's work and continues until
they leave the premises save where they choose an
unsafe route instead of the safe way provided.47
The second group embraces those engaged in work so
closely related to interstate transportation as to be prac-
tically a part of it. More dependence is placed here on
40 Washington Railway and Electric Co. v. Scala, Administratrix, 244 U. S.
630, 37 S. Ct. 654, 61 L. Ed. 1360 (1917), conductor; Hull, Administratrix,
v. Philadelphia and Reading Ry. Co., 252 U. S. 475, 40 S. Ct. 358, 64 L. Ed.
670 (1920), brakeman; Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Wright,
239 U. S. 548, 36 S. Ct. 185, 60 L. Ed. 431 (1916), engineer; Jacobs v. South-
ern Ry. Co., 241 U. S. 229, 36 S. Ct. 588, 60 L. Ed. 970 (1916), fireman.
41 Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Baldwin, 273 S. W. 834, cert. den. 270 U. S.
645, 46 S. Ct. 336, 70 L. Ed. 777 (1926).
42 Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern R. Co. v. Burtch, Administratrix, 263
U. S. 540, 44 S. Ct. 165, 68 L. Ed. 433 (1924) ; Pipal v. Grand Trunk Western
Ry. Co., 341 Ill. 320, 173 N. E. 372, cert. den. 283 U. S. 838, 51 S. Ct. 486,
75 L. Ed. 1449 (1931).
48 Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Moore, 228 U. S. 433, 33 S. Ct. 580, 57
L. Ed. 907 (1913).
44 Philadelphia and Reading Ry. Co. v. Hancock, 253 U. S. 284, 40 S. Ct.
512, 64 L. Ed. 907 (1920).
45 North Carolina R. Co. v. Zachary, Administrator, 232 U. S. 248, 34 S.
Ct. 305, 58 L. Ed. 591 (1914).
46 Jonas v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 48 S. W. (2d) 123 (Mo.), cert. den.
in 287 U. S. 610, 53 S. Ct. 13, 77 L. Ed. 530 (1932).
4 Erie R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 170, 37 S. Ct. 556, 61 L. Ed. 1057
(1917); Krysiak v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 270 F. 758 (C. C. A. 3d, 1921).
But where a switchtender, not on duty, was walking unnecessarily along
right of way en route from home to place of work and quarter mile away,
he was held not within act. Aldredge v. Baltimore and Ohio R. Co., 20 F.
(2d) 655, cert. den. 275 U. S. 550, 48 S. Ct. 114, 72 L. Ed. 420 (1927).
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the instrumentality-upon those things which have ac-
quired a status as permanently used in interstate trans-
portation, such as roadbed, track, tunnel, bridge, signal;
instrumentalities whose character is derived from their
assignment at a particular time to, or use in, interstate
transportation, such as engines and cars, as well as those
which are incidental or accessory thereto, such as sta-
tions, yards, repair shops, roundhouses, water tanks,
coal chutes and the like. The cases lead one through
the intricacies of railway operation and demonstrate
that an occupational classification would be futile.
Participation in interstate transportation may be
classed as direct, as in the case of train operatives and
others already mentioned; mediate, as in the case of
repair and maintenance of indispensable facilities; and
remote, as the steps preparatory to the first two divi-
sions. It seems more difficult to apply the test to the
mediate and the remote, and therefore these particular
classes will receive major treatment.
CONSTRUCTION, MAINTENANCE, AND REPAIR
Instrumentalities permanently used in interstate
transportation will be considered first. The test an-
nounced by the Supreme Court requires work so closely
related to interstate transportation as to be practically
a part of it. It is submitted that the relation must be
a practical one, or, as the Supreme Court has said, a
real or substantial one. Transportation by railroad is
not practically possible without construction of roadbed
and rails.
Beginning with new construction over which interstate
commerce has never passed, the cases uniformly hold
that employees engaged therein are excluded from the
provisions of the act. Thus, a laborer working in a
tunnel under construction and designed for use in inter-
state transportation was held not to be within the act ;48
nor a carpenter completing forms for concrete retaining
4 8 Raymond v. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul R. Co., 243 U. S. 43, 37
S. Ct. 268, 61 L. Ed. 583 (1917).
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walls to support track elevation.4 9 As broad a statement
of the application of the test to new construction as has
been found in the cases reviewed is the expression of
the Commission of Appeals of Texas, Section A, in
Texas and Pacific Railway Company v. Kelly,50 which
involved an injury to a workman while helping to install
an interlocking system to replace manual switching on
tracks over which the railway company was engaged
daily in interstate commerce. The system had not been
used and was not ready for use when the accident oc-
curred. The court said:
If Kelly had been at work on the track, which was being used
by trains in the transportation of interstate commerce, or if
he had been at work upon a bridge likewise used in interstate
transportation, or if he had been working upon the levers and
parts of the device used by the railroad company in the opera-
tion of its tracks, he would come within the provisions of the
Federal Employers' Liability Act. In other words, as we con-
strue the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States,
it is held that the Federal Employers' Liability Act protects
only those employed in interstate transportation. Those em-
ployed to work upon roadbeds, rails, ties, cars, engines, and
other instrumentalities, which are intended for use in inter-
state transportation, but which have never been' and are not
in use therein, are not protected by that act. A distinction has
been drawn between construction work and repair work, and it
is held that an employee engaged in repairs on an appliance
which is an integral part of interstate transportation is within
the provisions of the act, but if the employee is employed
at the time of his injury in the making of new appliances
to be used in the future, he is not so engaged and will not
be protected by the act.
Noteworthy, however, is the holding that even where the
new construction has not been opened for the receipt and
delivery of freight, the situation changes if interstate
transportation is performed in connection therewith al-
though not for the public. In Kelly v. Norfolk and West-
49 Dickinson v. Industrial Board, 280 Ill. 342, 117 N. E. 438 (1917).
5051 S. W. (2d) 299 (Texas), cert. den. 287 U. S. 644, 53 S. Ct. 90, 77
L. Ed. 557 (1932).
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ern Railway Company," the defendant was engaged in
constructing tracks for a new yard. The state line be-
tween Virginia and West Virginia crossed one of these
tracks a few feet east of its junction with the main line,
and plaintiff had crossed the state line to the lead track
with an engine and caboose and under orders was return-
ing with some empty cars to the Virginia yard. While
still in West Virginia he was injured. The court held
that interstate color was given to his service by the
interstate movement of the empty cars and not by the
fact that they were moved as an incident to new construc-
tion work. Likewise, in New York, Chicago and St. Louis
Railroad Company v. Slater52 an employee was injured
during the loading of stringers after the completion of
their use as supports for temporary tracks in a cut-off
under construction to shorten a curve, the cut-off being
incomplete and not yet used in interstate commerce. The
court decided that the intent to transport the stringers
from Ohio to Indiana, and their actual shipment, gave
interstate character to the employment, and disregarded
the incidents of issuance of waybill or bill of lading, as
well as the non-use of the cut-off in interstate trans-
portation.
Leaving new construction, we turn to the broad field
of maintenance and repair of those instrumentalities
which have been permanently dedicated, it might be said,
to interstate transportation, such as roadbed, track, and
the like. We find in an early case, 53 which was decided
while the Second Employers' Liability Cases were pend-
ing in the Supreme Court, that interstate commerce in-
herently abides in the track even though used for the
double purpose of interstate and local traffic. In that
case the employee's eye was injured while he was driv-
ing a spike into the ties. It has been held that the work
of maintaining roadbeds and tracks in proper condition
after they have become instrumentalities of interstate
51 19 F. (2d) 808.
52 23 F. (2d) 777, cert. den. 277 U. S. 605, 48 S. Ct. 601, 72 L. Ed. 1011
(1928).
53 Zikos v. Oregon Railroad and Navigation Co., 179 F. 893 (1910).
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commerce is clearly within the act.54 Ballasting the main
track of a railroad which carries freight and passengers
between different states is undoubtedly work done in
interstate commerce.55 Likewise, the work of repairing
(painting) block signals is one that directly affects or
facilitates the carriage of interstate commerce.5 6 In
Anest v. Columbia and Puget Sound Railroad Com-
pany,57 the court said:
In the present case there could be no possible separation of
decedent's inspection of appellant's track for the purpose of its
intrastate commerce and of its interstate commerce. The two
were obviously concomitant. His inspection was for the purpose
of aiding and assisting the appellant in the operation of its
trains, cars, and locomotives, and the carrying on of its busi-
ness both of interstate and intrastate commerce.
A section laborer, assisting in the repair of the main
track, who was injured when a pebble rebounded and
struck his eye, was held to be within the provisions of
the act.58 The same was true of a snow shoveler.5 9 In
Lombardo v. Boston and Maine Railroad,60 a laborer
shoveling dirt between ties under rails was held to be
engaged in repairing the track and within the protection
of the act. In a case in the Supreme Court decided May
19, 1919,61 an employee was injured while in charge of
a car in the process of filling in earth to replace a rail-
road trestle used in interstate commerce. The court held
that he was employed in keeping the interstate track,
which was in daily use, clear and safe for interstate
trains, thus avoiding delay to the commerce passing
over it, and therefore was within the act. In Smith v.
54 Tralich v. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Ry. Co., 217 F. 675 (1914).
55 San Pedro, Los Angeles and Salt Lake R. Co. v. Davide, 210 F. 870
(1914).
56 Brewer v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 259 S. W. 825, (Mo. 1924), rehearing
denied.
5789 Wash. 609, 154 P. 1100 (1916).
58 New York Central R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147, 37 S. Ct. 546, 61
L. Ed. 1045 (1917).
59 New York Central R. Co. v. Porter, 249 U. S. 168, 39 S. Ct. 188, 63 L. Ed.
536 (1919).
60 223 F. 427 (1915).
61 Kinzell v. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Ry. Co., 250 U. S. 130,
39 S. Ct. 412, 63 L. Ed. 893 (1919).
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Payne, 2 a helper, assisting another man to gauge the
steam in a switch pipe connected with tracks used for
both intrastate and interstate commerce, was held to
be employed in the latter. The same is true of a road-
master while engaged in the supervision of track re-
pairs,63 and of a trackman employed in the repair of
switches.6 4 But one injured during the digging of a
ditch beside the track for two posts on which a spare
rail was to rest until needed in repairing the track was
held not to be engaged in work so closely allied to inter-
state transportation as to be a part thereof." Tested by
the Harrington case, this conclusion was correct, for the
work was nothing more than the putting of the rail in a
convenient place from which it could be taken as required
for use.
The Pedersen case definitely brought the work of re-
pairing bridges within the protection of the act. Prepar-
atory steps to repair a bridge, such as unloading timbers
and cross-ties, were held to be a part of the task of
repairing the bridge in Kansas City Southern Railway
Company v. Martin.6 6 Likewise, painting, which protects
a bridge from action of the elements, was held to be work
related to interstate transportation in Louisville and
Nashville Railroad Company v. Netherton,67 where the
Pedersen case was cited.
Water is recognized as one of the arch enemies of suc-
cessful railroading; so drainage of the roadbed is an
essential part of its maintenance, and employees engaged
in installing devices to carry off the water are held to be
within the act.6
8
62 269 F. 1 (C. C. A. 3d, 1920).
68 Louisiana Railway and Navigation Co. v. Williams, 272 F. 439, dismissed
for want of jurisdiction, 257 U. S. 610, 42 S. Ct. 48, 66 L. Ed. 396 (1921).
64 Central R. Co. of New Jersey v. Colasurdo, 192 F. 901, writ of error
dismissed 226 U. S. 617, 33 S. Ct. 111, 57 L. Ed. 383 (1912).
65 De Santis v. New York, New Haven and Hartford R. Co., 74 F. (2d)
261 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
66262 F. 241 (1920).
67 175 Ky. 159, 193 S. W. 1035 (1917).
08 Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio Ry. Co. v. Contois, 288 S. W.
154, aff'g 279 S. W. 929 (Tex., 1926), cert. den. 274 U. S. 747, 47 S. Ct. 659,
71 L. Ed. 1328 (1927).
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An extremely liberal application of the rule is found
in the case of Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company v.
Russo,69 where a water boy carrying water to laborers
in a gang engaged in replacing rails in the main line was
held to be contributing his part toward the end in view
and his work so intimately connected with interstate
commerce as to be a part thereof. This apparently fol-
lows the authority of Philadelphia, Baltimore and Wash-
ington Railroad Company v. Smith,70 where a cook in a
camp car used by a gang of bridge carpenters employed
to repair bridges and abutments upon the line of rail-
way was held within the act. Bennor v. Oregon-Washing-
ton Railroad and Navigation Company,71 also on the
authority of the Smith case, held that a "bull cook," an
assistant who carried supplies and did roustabout work
outside but had nothing to do inside with the cook for
a repair gang engaged in maintenance of track, was
employed in interstate commerce within the act. These
cases involving injuries to cooks or laborers while in
camp cars or bunk cars seem to be brought within the
act on the theory that there were no local facilities for
the quartering of the crews and that by the conditions
of their employment they were necessarily on the railway
premises. In Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific
Railroad Company v. Kane,72 the workman was crossing
the track on a personal errand before breakfast when he
was killed. The court said he was within the act, his
employment being definite and the nature and place of
his service for the day clearly understood, although he
had not yet lifted a pick or stuck a shovel into the
ground and was not to engage in work for an hour and
a half later.
Approving the general rule, the court in Southern
Pacific Company v. Industrial Commission71 nevertheless
69 91 Ind. App. 648, 163 N. E. 283, cert. den. 282 U. S. 846, 51 S. Ct.
25, 75 L. Ed. 751 (1930).
70250 U. S. 101, 39 S. Ct. 396, 63 L. Ed. 869 (1919).
71 175 Wash. 559, 27 P. (2d) 1082 (1933).
72 33 F. (2d) 866 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929), cert. den. 280 U. S. 588, 50 S.
Ct. 37, 74 L. Ed. 637 (1929).
78 71 Utah 248, 264 P. 965 (1927), cert. den. 278 U. S. 605, 49 S. Ct. 11,
73 L. Ed. 533 (1928).
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declined to extend the protection of the act to one injured
while adjusting the sickle bar of a mower used to rid
the right of way of noxious weeds on the ground that
the mower was "an instrumentality in no sense used
in commerce. "
Cases which involve injuries to workers engaged in
repairing rolling stock are difficult to classify as within
or without the act. Unlike a railway track, "an engine,
as such, is not permanently devoted to any kind of
traffic," said the Supreme Court in the Winters case.
74
In Glidewell v. Quincy, Omaha and Kansas City Railroad
Company,75 the court said the place (whether in a black-
smith shop or standing on track) of doing the work was
not the test, but the character of the work being done.
"Duration of withdrawal from use" is a circumstance to
be considered, and "it is this separation that gives char-
acter to the employment ... as being in or not in com-
merce." ' 6 In the case of New York, New Haven and
Hartford Railroad Company v. Bezue,77 the Supreme
Court said that "the length of the period" (in this case
twelve days) "during which the locomotive was with-
drawn from service and the extent of the repairs"
stamped the engine as no longer an instrumentality of,
or intimately connected with, interstate activity.
Necessarily, the time element is variable. In the Win-
ters case the engine had been withdrawn three days from
service, and before and after withdrawal hauled both
interstate and intrastate commerce. In Scoggins v. Union
Pacific Railroad Company,78 the car was in the course
of repair for nearly two months, and the case was held
not to come within the act; the court quoted from the
Winters and Davis cases. An engine on the repair tracks
for several months was held not to be in interstate
transportation, although it was to be returned to such
74 Minneapolis and St. Louis R. Co. v. Winters, 242 U. S. 353, 37 S. Ct.
170, 61 L. Ed. 358 (1917).
75 208 Mo. App. 372, 236 S. W. 677, rehearing denied January 9, 1922.
76 Industrial Accident Commission v. Davis, 259 U. S. 182, 42 S. Ct. 489,
66 L. Ed. 888 (1922).
77 284 U. S. 415, 52 S. Ct. 205, 76 L. Ed. 370 (1932).
78 292 F. 162 (D. C., D. Minn., Fourth Div., 1923).
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service when overhauling was completed.7'9 An empty
car, carded as in "bad order," from which an interstate
shipment had been unloaded the same day, was placed
on the track to be returned to the owning road, a con-
templated intrastate movement; and a car repairer work-
ing on this car was held not engaged in interstate trans-
portation s.8  An engine out of service thirteen days and
in roundhouse was not considered to be in interstate
transportation in James v. Chicago and North Western
Railway Company."' Likewise, a car in the yard awaiting
further use, interstate or intrastate, is not in interstate
commerce. 2 Withdrawal for seventy-nine days was held
to be excluded from the operation of the act in Chicago,
Kalamazoo and Saginaw Railway Company v. Kindle-
sparker.8 3 In Day v. Chicago and North Western Rail-
way Company,"4 the plaintiff was injured while he was
working on an engine which had been sent to the shops
for heavy repairs. Seven days after the engine entered
the roundhouse and twenty-two days before the repairs
were completed, the plaintiff was injured. The court dis-
tinguished between a locomotive pulling a train in inter-
state transportation which is repaired en route to enable
it to complete the trip, and the engine here, which was
not engaged in transportation of any kind, had no trac-
tive power, and was unable to transport anything what-
soever.
A late case which might properly be included among
the cases involving repairs to equipment is Sullivan v.
New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Com-
pany,s5 where a boiler-one of many used to drive tur-
bines that operated generators that supplied the elec-
tricity for locomotives used by the railroad in interstate
79 Connolly v. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Ry. Co., 3 F. (2d) 818
(D. C., W. D. Wash., 1925).
80 Bartosik v. Chicago River and Indiana R. Co., 266 Il. App. 28 (1932),
cert. den. 288 U. S. 609, 53 S. Ct. 401, 77 L. Ed. 983 (1933).
81 115 Neb. 164, 211 N. W. 1003 (1927).
82 Moran v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, 88 N. J. L. 730, 96 A. 1023,
affirmed 245 U. S. 629, 38 S. Ct. 62, 62 L. Ed. 519 (1917).
83246 U. S. 657, 38 S. Ct. 425, 62 L. Ed. 925 (1918), reversing and
remanding 234 F. 1.
84 354 111. 469, 188 N. E. 540 (1933).
8574 F. (2d) 725 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
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and intrastate commerce-had been completely discon-
nected from the plant so far as power or operation
was concerned for about four days and was entirely cold
when the accident occurred. Enough boilers were on
hand so that several could be repaired while others were
in operation. The court commented upon the impossibil-
ity of reconciling the cases, saying that the test cannot
be the destination of the boiler for interstate commerce
or its future employment therein, but whether it was a
necessary part of the equipment at the time of the
accident or was then only a spare part completely with-
drawn from use.
So far as the repair of rolling stock is concerned, it
appears that the rule originally was that if repairs could
be made without materially interrupting the interstate
journey, they were within the statute, 6 but that if the
engine or car were withdrawn from indiscriminate use
in both interstate and intrastate commerce, and use after
repair was not definitely designated, they were excluded.
The present rule seems to be that if the engine or car
must be definitely withdrawn from all traffic while the
repairs are in progress, so that it is no longer an in-
strumentality of, or intimately concerned with, interstate
activity, the work is not within the protection of the act.
REMOTE PARTICIPATION
With respect to remote participation in interstate
transportation, such as at stations, yards, water tanks,
coal chutes, and the like, as well as the furnishing of sup-
plies, the courts have held that a station agent on an
interstate line lighting a fire in a depot stove ;81 a station
clerk turning off light at the close of the day's work; s8
a janitor in the general office of a railroad ;89 or an assist-
86 Minneapolis and St. Louis R. Co. v. Winters, 242 U. S. 353, 37 S. Ct.
170, 61 L. Ed. 358 (1917).
87 Benson v. Bush, 104 Kan. 198, 178 P. 747 (1919).
88 Sullivan v. New York, New Haven and Hartford R. Co., 105 Conn. 122,
134 A. 795 (1926), cert. den. 273 U. S. 754, 47 S. Ct. 457, 71 L. Ed. 875
(1927).
89 Great Northern Ry. Co. v. King, 165 Wis. 159, 161 N. W. 371 (1917).
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ant gardener employed to cultivate a yard and burn
trash,90 are not within the protection of the act. Activ-
ities purely for the purpose of changing shop machinery
are not given an interstate character by reason of the
fact that the fixture is used to transmit power to the
machinery used in the repair of cars assigned at various
times to both interstate and intrastate transportation.9
The mere transfer of fuel or rails from one place to
another so as to make them more convenient for use is
not so close a relation to interstate transportation as
to bring the employee within the act. 2
Van Dusen v. Department of Labor and Industries93
is interesting because of the court's application of the
test in the Shanks case to a non-railway employment
in determining whether or not the worker was engaged
in interstate transportation. Van Dusen was employed
by the Northwest Radio Service Company, owning sta-
tion KGA at Spokane. The radio station, operating
under license from the Federal radio commission, was
at all times connected by telephone lines with cities in
other states for receiving and rebroadcasting programs
originating there. It became necessary to install an ice
machine to produce cold water to cool the radio tubes
in the transmitting station to prevent serious impair-
ment or suspension of transmission of programs. To
install the ice machine it was necessary to move the
switchboard, an integral part of the apparatus used
in broadcasting. During the moving, and within an hour
after the station had gone off the air for the night, Van
Dusen was accidentally electrocuted. It was admitted
that during broadcasting hours the station carried on
an interstate business. The State Department of Labor
and Industries rejected the widow's claim for pension
under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and the Su-
90 Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio Ry. Co. v. Chojnacky, 163 S. W.
1011, (Tex. Civ. App., 1914) rehearing denied 180 S. W. 141.
91 Shanks v. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western R. R. Co., 239 U. S.
556, 36 S. Ct. 188, 60 L. Ed. 436 (1916).
92 Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R. Co. v. Harrington, 241 U. S. 177,
36 S. Ct. 517, 60 L. Ed. 941 (1916).
93 158 Wash. 414, 290 P. 803 (1930).
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preme Court of Washington affirmed the order. By
analogy to a number of decisions under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, which applies only to rail-
roads, the court arrived at the conclusion that Van
Dusen, working in a broadcasting station after it had
signed off, was engaged in work so closely related to
interstate commerce as to be a part of it, the theory
apparently being that the instrumentality-the telephone
exchange-had previously been used as an integral part
of the radio station which was engaged in interstate
commerce. It is submitted that the test in the Shanks
case, which restricted "commerce" to "transportation,"
so far as the application of the Federal Employers' Li-
ability Act is concerned, is inapposite to the facts of
this case.
Educed from the decisions, the following questions
suggest themselves in attempting to reduce to its sim-
plest terms the rule which the Supreme Court has laid
down for determining when an employee is engaged in
interstate transportation within the act:
(1) What was his status with respect to interstate
transportation at the time of the injury ?
4
(2) Was he engaged at the time of his injury in active
employment in interstate transportation ?9
(3) Was he engaged at the time of his injury in work
941Roberts, Federal Liabilities of Carriers (2d ed.), II, sec. 727. Previous
engagement in interstate commerce, or contemplated future engagement
therein, held unimportant in Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R. Co. v. Har-
rington, 241 U. S. 177, 36 S. Ct. 517, 60 L. Ed. 941 (1916), citing Illinois
Central R. Co. v. Behrens, 233 U. S. 473, 34 S. Ct. 646, 58 L. Ed. 1051 (1914).
95 Pause in active duties of making up interstate train to gather coal for
warming shanty, held not inconsistent with duty to employer in Wyatt v.
New York, Ontario and Western R. Co., 45 F. (2d) 705, (C. C. A. 2d, 1930),
cert. den. 283 U. S. 829, 51 S. Ct. 353, 75 L. Ed. 1442 (1931). Car inspector
going to aid of fellow-employee and assisting to clear wreckage from track
used in interstate transportation, held within the act in Southern R. Co. v.
Puckett, 244 U. S. 571, 37 S. Ct. 703, 61 L. Ed. 1321 (1917). Track laborer,
substituting for signal lamplighter in switch yard, held within scope of employ-
ment in attempting to pick up loose piece of wire between tracks constituting
source of danger in Doyle v. St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Terminal R. Co.,
326 Mo. 425, 31 S. W. (2d) 1010 (1930), cert. den. 283 U. S. 820, 51 S. Ct.
345, 75 L. Ed. 1435 (1931).
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necessarily precedent or consequent to interstate trans-
portation ?96
(4) Was what he produced, used or intended to be
used, directly or indirectly, in the transportation of
anything ?
97
(5) If it is necessary to look to the instrumentality,
what gave to it its interstate character?9 If it was not
permanently devoted to interstate transportation, was it
assigned thereto at the time or had it been definitely with-
drawn therefrom?
(6) Was the instrumentality the medium of his em-
ployment in interstate transportation?
The act of transportation is the magnet which draws
to itself the instrumentality and the worker. The in-
strumentality must be devoted permanently or assigned
to interstate transportation at the time. The particular
work which the employee is doing in conjunction with
the instrumentality must be in furtherance of the inter-
state transportation in which the carrier is engaged.
Work purely incidental to the furnishing of the means
is insufficient.
Interstate employment follows interstate transporta-
tion and begins when the workman, on a carrier's
premises, makes a forward move to serve in that traffic
or employment, and ends only after he has completely
dissociated himself therefrom.9 9 The Federal Employers'
Liability Act does not define the term "employee."
Therefore, it was used in its ordinary signification and
96 Employee who had prepared engine for trip, held still "on duty" and
employed in interstate commerce, notwithstanding temporary absence from
engine on personal errand. North Carolina R. Co. v. Zachary, 232 U. S. 248,
34 S. Ct. 305, 58 L. Ed. 591 (1914).
97 Chicago and North Western R. Co. v. Bolle, 284 U. S. 74, 52 S. Ct. 59,
76 L. Ed. 173 (1931).
98 A single interstate passenger (Ralston Purina Co. v. Bansau, 73 F. (2d)
430) (C. C. A. 7th, 1934), car or shipment will give the quality of interstate
transportation to an entire train (Mappin v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe
R. Co., 198 Cal. 733, 247 P. 911 (1926), cert. den. 273 U. S. 729, 47 S. Ct.
239, 71 L. Ed. 862 (1927)), or if there is an element of interstate commerce
in traffic or employment, it determines the remedy (Philadelphia and Read-
ing R. Co. v. Polk, 256 U. S. 332, 41 S. Ct. 518, 65 L. Ed. 958 (1921)).
99 McKay, v. Monongahela R. Co., 44 F. (2d) 150 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930);
Patterson v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 284 Pa. 577, 131 A. 484 (1925), cert. den.
270 U. S. 649, 46 S. Ct. 349, 70 L. Ed. 780 (1926).
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includes a laborer when walking along a trestle to bunk
cars furnished by the railroad after finishing his day's
work.100
Efforts have been made to designate by steps or oper-
ations the closeness or the remoteness of the employee
to interstate transportation but with no practical result.
In Fenstermacher v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific
Railway Company,' the plaintiff was injured while load-
ing telegraph poles on cars whence they were to be taken
to repair a telegraph line used by the railroad in inter-
state commerce. The court said the work was removed
from the actual work of repairing an interstate facility
by at least three separate and distinct operations, and
so was too remote to be so closely related to interstate
commerce as to be practically a part of it. The court
indicated that the line must be drawn somewhere, not
undertaking to say where, and added:
If plaintiff was engaged in interstate commerce when he was
injured, then the railroad employee who felled the tree which
was made into the telegraph pole would be likewise engaged, if
that particular tree had been set apart for such purpose. Like-
wise, the railroad employee who sharpened the axe, used by the
employee who felled such tree, would come within the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, and we would have a connection
with interstate commerce about as close as that which "the
priest all shaven and shorn" bore to the famous "house that
Jack built."
The principle which the court in Rice v. Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad Company'012 derived from the authori-
tative decisions is that the act applies to a cause of action
occurring to an employee
(a) if then his general service is primarily and directly in
the interest of interstate commerce, and it is seen that he was
at the time engaged in a service necessarily precedent or con-
sequent to or in the full execution of the primary object, or
10OLouisville and Nashville R. Co. v. Walker's Admr., 162 Ky. 209, 172
S. W. 517 (1915).
101309 Mo. 475, 274 S. W. 718, cert. den. 269 U. S. 576, 46 S. Ct. 102,
70 L. Ed. 420 (1925).
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(b) that the injury was incurred during such a deflection from
the direct line of execution thereof, that it should be regarded
as but incidental or contingent thereto and reasonably necessary
to its completion. To serve interstate commerce must be seen
to have been, from the outset, a substantial purpose of the
work in which the injured employee was then engaged.
CONCLUSION
It has been suggested that the problems presented by
the test of engagement in interstate transportation point
to the conclusion that it is an "unworkable concept"
and that the repeal of the Federal act and the restoration
of the field of regulation to the states is the one rem-
edy.103 Agitation for amendment or repeal may bear
fruit in the future. However, we are dealing with an
existing condition and until some clearer test, some
simpler concept, is formulated, the vexatious problem
in each case must be confronted and solved. Thus, as
stated by the court in Flynn v. New York, Susquehanna
104 ihrfrnetand Western Railroad Company, with reference to
the difficulty of formulating an exact, comprehensive,
and exclusive rule by which to determine whether an
act falls within or without the statute:
Upon reflection, it would seem almost impossible to formu-
late a rule applicable to the almost endless variety of circum-
stances and facts springing out of the intricacies of everyday
modern life that will be of much practical use or aid. The
application of the principle must be made to particular facts, as
they arise; and by a process of exclusion and inclusion a
rule may perhaps be formulated in time from the decision of
such cases.
The test announced in the Shanks case, restated in
numerous cases, must furnish the answer to the question
whether an employee at the time of his injury is engaged
in interstate transportation so as to claim the protection
of the Federal act.
103 Lester P. Schoene and Frank Watson, "Workmen's Compensation on
Interstate Railways," 47 Harv. L. Rev. 389.
104 90 N. J. L. 450, 101 A. 1034 (1917), affirmed 91 N. J. L. 693, 103 A.
1052 (1917).
